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how much more pointed this confrontation of Greek with Christian writers would be, if the end it serves were made to seem worth while by some discussion of the validity of the theories illustrated. An instance of this evasion occurs in connection with the Stoic indifference to immortality. 'We need not inquire,' we are told, whether Stoicism was right or wrong in insisting that virtue should be pursued for its own sake rather than for the sake of rewards after death. Why need we not inquire? The reflexion occurs that it is perhaps because the consequences of inquiry would be humiliating for Christianity. Take, again, the paper, the last in the book, on the value of a classical education. What one naturally expects is some estimate of its value in comparison with other methods of education; what we get is a description, rather vague and high-flown, of the beneficent effects of the classics on character, with no attempt to show that no other discipline would produce equally good effects. An extraordinary slip may be noted at the beginning of this essay. A friend of the author's, it seems, was constantly asking, as to classical education, *cui bono?* and it is plain from the context that this phrase is taken to mean, What good is it? and not, what of course it does mean, Whom does it benefit?

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ROMAN STOICISM: Being Lectures on the History of the Stoic Philosophy with special reference to its Development within the Roman Empire. By E. Vernon Arnold, Litt.D., etc. Cambridge: University Press, 1911. Pp. ix, 468.

In Dr. Bussell's work on "Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics," which I reviewed recently in this JOURNAL, one special aspect of the school was brought out, namely, its approximation to a 'Buddhistic' quietism. Professor Arnold's treatment might serve to correct this presentation if taken as exclusive. What he brings out especially is the interesting detail of the Stoic ethics, its humanity,—both in the general sense and as opposed to ascetic aversion from the world,—and its essential moderation in practice. His own exposition has something of the character impressed by the Stoics of the transition who passed on the philosophic doctrine from Zeno and his successors to the

Romans of the Empire. Teachers like Panaetius and Posidonius, in their different ways, as he notes, made Stoicism accessible to a larger world by giving it a more literary and even a semi-popular character. Thus while in Professor Arnold's work we get a much more balanced view than in Dr. Bussell's, we are still left by both writers dependent on more technical expositors for exact knowledge of the system as a scientific structure. Perhaps we ought not to expect this exactitude in relation to the early period in works dealing with later or with Roman Stoicism; and certainly no fault can be found as regards full and accurate citation of the sources. The citations, it may be mentioned, are in the form of footnotes, and are not, as in Dr. Bussell's work, incorporated in the text without translation; so that the general reader will find the book easier.

Students of the transitional and eclectic period of Stoicism have recently found their attention much directed to Posidonius, who had a powerful influence in bringing the philosophy into sympathetic relations (absent at first) with popular religion. A tendency resembling this may be noticed in Professor Arnold. Regarding Stoicism (unlike Dr. Bussell) as a system with a permanent value, he tries to show, first that it arose as one portion of a religious propaganda from East to West; and, finally, that it contributed considerable elements to nascent Christianity. In this last aspect, he holds that its interest is not yet exhausted. To demonstrate the Stoic elements in the earliest Christianity, and through this demonstration to carry them forward into the Christianity of the future, is for him a living problem. In both his historical contentions, a portion of truth may be admitted. Philosophy, as he insists at the beginning, did not develop apart from relation to the propagandist religions of the East. On this, I think, something remains to be made out, but I will not discuss it here. It is quite true that "the era of philosophy is the era of the world-religions" (p. 4). And Christianity, growing up in the period of official Stoicism, naturally absorbed much of it till later the Platonizing movement became predominant and determined its theory of the soul, as Stoicism had largely furnished the basis of its ethics. Yet on neither side do Professor Arnold's positions seem wholly true. The history of a philosophic school cannot be summed up as essentially a transition between two phases of religious propaganda. Undoubtedly Stoicism had religious affinities. Its origins, with

those of Greek philosophy in general, as I have allowed, cannot be wholly understood in isolation from the propaganda of the 'universalist' religions. Yet, in spite of this I hold that the impression which, as the author says, has arisen from Roman literature and is still widespread, "that Greece was the birthplace of philosophy, and that its triumphs must be placed to the credit of Hellenic culture" (p. 3), is substantially true. Philosophy, for all its contacts with religion, was a thing of a new kind, not simply one 'new religion' among others. If, in the end, it had merely furnished elements to that which became, at the close of the ancient world, the triumphant religion, and had not again recovered its independence, it would have been lost as philosophy. So on the other side, a Christianity interpreted as Professor Arnold in his concluding chapter suggests that it may be interpreted, namely, as a kind of philosophy with an emotional coloring, would not be the religion of the historic Christian Church.

Thus it seems to me that his tone in referring to the repression of the new religion under the Antonines results from a misunderstanding. 'Pious' as Marcus Aurelius no doubt was personally towards the ancient gods, he certainly did not persecute the Christians from a horror of their 'atheism.' And indeed I must observe that in a passage where this is suggested, the reference (p. 124, n. 137) to M. Aurelius, xii, 28, is misleading if supposed to bear out what is said in the text: namely, that the emperor held in reserve "the sword, the cross, and the stake for the atheists who refused to be convinced." This comes not from anything said by the emperor himself, but from the legend of the Lyons martyrs, regarded by competent critics who have gone further than Renan in discounting ecclesiastical presuppositions, not as an authentic document, but as a romance. And Renan himself, in spite of his acceptance (in one place though not in another) of the legendary details, points to the true ground of the procedure against the Church by the Roman government, when he says that a state tolerant in principle found itself compelled either to persecute or to become a theocracy. As to the number of martyrdoms, Origen, in the middle of the third century, recognizes that up to then they had been very few.

It is curious that while, in the passage just referred to, Professor Arnold explains the supposed severity of the philosophic

emperor by the remark that he was, after all, a king, he makes a point elsewhere of protesting against the 'republican prejudices' displayed by the Stoics of the first century. He does not say whether he considers it one manifestation of those prejudices that, as he very reasonably puts it in speaking of the reign of Caligula (p. 393): "We may infer that, like the Jews, they resisted tacitly or openly the claim of the emperor to be regarded as a god"; but he is careful to note that, in the persecution of the philosophers under Nero, "the modern historian finds extenuating circumstances" (p. 399). Elsewhere (p. 20) he remarks that "in the first century of the principate Stoicism imparted a halo of heroism to a political and social opposition which otherwise would evoke little sympathy." Apparently his own view is that the Cæsarean monarchy introduced into the administration a more liberal spirit than that of the Senate; and yet, when it comes to detail, he has to assign to the second century the genuinely liberal movement by which the law was systematically rendered more humane under the influence of Stoicism. Now the empire from Nerva onwards was definitely a new departure in which the senatorial (and especially the Stoical) opposition came into power. The monarchical form, as the author correctly notes, was not condemned by the philosophers as a class. What no ancient philosopher could approve of, as he might have pointed out more clearly, was absolutism.

I note finally a detail of terminology where a preference (not to say prejudice) decidedly not republican is displayed. For the name of the 'ruling principle' in the soul the author selects as translation the term 'principate'; adding as comment (p. 90, n. 81): "There is a slight inconvenience, but also a real advantage, in using this term both in its philosophic sense for the governing part of the soul, and historically for the system of government founded by Augustus. There is a genuine analogy between the two, though it is not developed by the Latin writers." Why it was not developed is obvious. Professor Arnold himself has noted how, in spite of the ease with which they could have brought it within their system of historical explanations applied to religions, the philosophers, whether on good terms with the government or not, tacitly disdained to find a place for the contemporary deification of the emperors. To Stoicism under the principate, nothing could have been more

antipathetic than to lay stress on the use of the same name for the power of the emperor and for that which in the soul corresponds to deity in the world.

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THE PLEROMA: AN ESSAY ON THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY. By Paul Carus. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1909. Pp. vi, 163.

The object of this book is to show that "Christianity is not the result of accident, but of necessity," and to indicate how "its doctrines, its ceremonies, and its ethics are the product of given conditions." Dr. Carus explains that "the author's method is purely scientific," and that "he has investigated the origin of Christianity as a botanist would study the growth of a tree." The spirit in which he approaches what to him seem the facts of history is indeed what one looks for in a scientist. It is truth-seeking, hospitable to new ideas, and independent, yet conservative in the best sense, reverent, and appreciative of relative values. There is an effort at comprehensiveness of research, a manifest eagerness to cast at least a glance at every fact likely to have a bearing on the subject under discussion, a desire to examine each question from every viewpoint that promises new light. No scientific inquirer will be seriously disposed to take up the cudgels against the main contentions of the author. His fundamental positions are perfectly self-evident. All historians worthy of the name believe to-day in a law of cause and effect and in an evolution of man's social life, including his religious consciousness and its expressions. A botanist feels under no obligation to spend half his time explaining that the tree has grown up out of the ground, and has not fallen down from the sky. We might therefore easily get the impression that this author has used too much force in breaking through open doors. But Dr. Carus knows what deeply rooted prejudices there are in this particular field of study, and his emphasis on the natural origin of Christianity is not unnecessary. In an age of excessive specialization there is a need of scholars willing to acquaint themselves in a fashion with the advance of science all along the line and capable of popularizing the results, problems, and experiments in various departments